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Abstract 
The present research investigated the moderating effect of target status on the 
relation between social dominance orientation and fairness in either a positively or 
negatively framed limited resource allocation decision. Participants were asked to read 
medical case files about either a high or low status patient in need of a heart transplant, 
then assigned the patient a transplant priority rating based on information in the case file 
and rating criteria provided, before completing Sidanius and Pratto’s Social Dominance 
Orientation scale. In Study 1, the positively framed allocation task, we found a significant 
interaction, in which low SDO individuals were less fair and more favourable when 
making decisions about a low status target, whereas high SDO individuals were less fair 
and more favourable when making decisions about a high status target. In Study 2, we 
again found a significant interaction when controlling for belief in a just world, such that 
low SDO individuals were less fair and more favourable to low status targets than high 
status targets, whereas high SDO individuals were equally fair to all targets, regardless of 
status. These results suggest that, on average, when allocating a limited resource, high 
SDO individuals follow fairness guidelines more closely than low SDO individuals.  
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Tough But Fair: The Moderating Effects of Target Status on the Relation Between  
Social Dominance Orientation and Fairness 
Global population is growing rapidly, and a fixed number of resources are being 
shared between more and more people. As a result, distributive justice (justice concerning 
the distribution of goods and services in society) is becoming more important than ever. 
The topic of distributive justice has received a great deal of attention in social 
psychology. One line of research has examined individual differences in willingness to 
follow fairness guidelines (e.g., treating everyone the same; distributing resources on an 
equitable basis).  For example, openness to experience has been shown to relate to 
support for redistribution of resources (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). 
The purpose of the research reported in this thesis was to investigate whether 
individual differences in social dominance orientation predict the extent to which people 
follow fairness guidelines. In the following sections, social dominance orientation will be 
described, fairness will be defined, and the possible relation between these concepts will 
be explained. 
Social Dominance Orientation 
Intriguingly, some recent research (Hafer, personal communication, May, 2011) 
suggests that those who are most comfortable with group disparity and hierarchical 
differences in society may be best at making tough but fair decisions. Specifically, Hafer 
found that individuals who were high in Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) were less 
likely than individuals who were low in SDO to provide a reward unfairly to a 
disadvantaged person (methodological details will be expanded later). 
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Social Dominance Orientation is a personality trait that measures one’s preference 
for maintaining group-based hierarchies within social systems (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). SDO exists as an individual difference variable within the 
larger framework of Social Dominance Theory (SDT), which was created to explain why 
all observed societies organize themselves into group-based hierarchies, composed of at 
least one dominant group and at least one subordinate group (Sidanius, Pratto, Laar, & 
Levin, 2004). For the purposes of SDT, a dominant group is one that has disproportionate 
access to positive social value, such as education, medicine, or safety, whereas a 
subordinate group is one that has disproportionate access to negative social value, such as 
disease, punishment, or substandard housing (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). To 
explain the emergence of these groups, SDT focuses on group asymmetries at the level of 
the individual, the level of the group, and the level of the whole society (see Figure 1; 
Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001). At each level, there are “hierarchy 
enhancing” forces (e.g., SDO, ingroup violence, and certain parts of the criminal justice 
system) and “hierarchy-attenuating” forces (e.g., charitable donations, affirmative action, 
and income redistribution policies). These two sets of forces exist in a balance, and the 
relative strength of each dictates the degree of inequality between groups. Hierarchical 
equilibrium is said to exist when inequality is sufficient to satisfy dominant group 
members’ need for hierarchy, without becoming morally repugnant or socially 
destabilizing (Sidanius et al., 2001).   
SDO acts, within this context, as a variable that explains differences at the 
individual level that facilitate the maintenance of hierarchy. As such, it is not surprising 
that support for chauvinist policies, law and order policies, and military programs are  
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Figure 1. The trimorphic structure of group-based dominance in Social Dominance 
Theory. 
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positively correlated with SDO, whereas SDO is negatively correlated with support for 
gay rights, women’s rights, social welfare policies, ameliorative racial policies, and 
interracial marriage (Pratto et al., 1994). Though these policies and beliefs seem 
redundant with conservatism—and, indeed, SDO is related to economic conservatism (r 
= .54; Crowson & Brandes, 2010)—it is important to note that each of these correlates 
has a distinct hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating effect. For instance, support 
for law and order policies allows dominant groups to maintain their privilege. In a 
number of societies studied around the world, subordinate group members are 
disproportionately imprisoned, tortured, and executed, even when controlling for higher 
rates of criminality (Pratto et al., 2006). In contrast, support for institutions like 
interracial marriage undermine the dominant group’s disproportionate access to positive 
social value, because once married, subordinate group members gain at least partial 
access to the social value accessible to their partners and married couples in general, such 
as health benefits and tax breaks. It is important to remember that SDO is a measure of 
preference for group dominance, not individual dominance. In Pratto et al.'s (1994) initial 
validation of the scale, SDO was uncorrelated with the dominance subscales of the 
California Personality Inventory and the Jackson Personality Research Form in four out 
of five samples. 
SDO may appear redundant with other individual difference variables, but a more 
nuanced look shows that SDO makes unique predictions that separate it from its 
correlates. For example, both right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and SDO are 
considered among the most prominent individual difference variables thought to be 
responsible for prejudice (Duckitt, 2006), and as such could both be expected to predict 
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aggression towards outgroups. However, whether or not this is the case depends on 
whether the targets are members of a dominant group or a subordinate group. Henry, 
Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto (2005) examined this issue by asking American and Lebanese 
students their attitudes towards terror and intergroup violence. In the U.S., RWA and 
SDO both predicted increased support for fighting Middle Eastern terrorists, because 
fighting terrorists is both a submission to ingroup authority (hence, the RWA correlation) 
and a use of power that helps to secure America’s dominant position on the global stage 
(hence, the SDO correlation). In Lebanon, however, higher RWA was predictive of 
support for violence against Western (U.S.) interests, but SDO was not. High SDO 
individuals, regardless of group membership, tend to support actions that maintain 
hierarchies and oppose actions that do not. As such, given that the U.S. is the dominant 
group, high SDO Lebanese individuals opposed action that would reduce the group 
differences between the U.S. and Lebanon, in keeping with SDT’s description of the 
active contribution of subordinate group members to their own lower status.  
Although both RWA and SDO are generally positively related to prejudice and 
negative stereotypes towards minorities (Whitley, 1999), research suggests that the 
mechanism by which these attitude structures lead to this prejudice is different.  
Individuals high in RWA are generally high in dangerous world beliefs (beliefs that the 
world is a dangerous place in which the safety and values of good people are threatened 
by bad people), whereas high SDO individuals tend to hold stronger competitive world 
beliefs (beliefs that the social world is a ruthless place in which force is justified and one 
has to fight to win; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007). Compatible with both of these 
perspectives, most groups that are the target of prejudice, such as homosexuals, can be 
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construed as both threatening to social order and threatening to the advantaged position 
of dominant groups. But when threats to social order and social dominance are 
dissociated, the differential effects of RWA and SDO can be seen clearly. For example, 
Duckitt (2006) found that RWA was more predictive of prejudice against rock stars than 
was SDO, presumably because rock stars represent a group that is high in perceived 
social deviance but also holds high status. SDO, however, was more predictive of 
prejudice than RWA when the target of prejudice was housewives, who are low status but 
not socially deviant.  
Fairness 
 Fairness is typically conceptualized as a between-persons comparison, evaluating 
the presence or absence of matching ratios of inputs to outputs (Walster, Walster, & 
Berscheid, 1978). Fairness exists when an individual is receiving a similar proportion of 
inputs to outputs as other people. “Inputs” can include education, expertise, effort, and 
other factors that typically are associated with better outcomes, and “outputs” can include 
salary, status, and other valued states.  For example, in the “ultimatum game,” players 
must accept or reject a single offer from another player.  These decisions are strongly 
affected by offers made to other players; identical offers can be accepted or rejected 
based on comparisons to the offers to others (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2003). Thus, 
between-persons comparisons play a key role in judgments of fairness. 
 These perceptions of fairness seem to be very important to people, with violations 
of fairness eliciting a range of negative behaviours and emotions. In the ultimatum game 
mentioned above, participants were motivated to punish players who they felt were 
distributing in-game resources unfairly (Falk et al., 2003). Mikula, Scherer, and 
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Athenstaedt (1998) had participants from 37 countries describe a range of situations that 
elicited negative emotions, such as fear, anger, disgust, shame, or sadness. Anger-
producing events were found to be most often perceived as unfair. Furthermore, unfair 
events were judged as more immoral, more obstructive to goals, and having a more 
negative effect on relationships.  
 Further evidence for the importance of perceived fairness comes from the 
punishment literature. Darley (2009) found that, in the context of games in which trust 
and fairness are violated, participants will use their own resources to punish individuals 
who violate fairness. For instance, players will punish another player for failing to 
reciprocate when a third player acts in good faith and sacrifices personal resources for the 
good of the group. This tendency to punish violations of fairness holds even when the 
punisher will not be involved in future games with the transgressor, and when the 
punisher is completely anonymous, meaning that he or she cannot benefit from gaining a 
reputation as a player who should not be taken advantage of (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). 
This behaviour has been labeled altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In fact, 
punishment of fairness violations is associated with activation of reward centers in the 
brain, regardless of whether punishment is retributive or altruistic (Darley, 2009).  
Strong negative reactions to violations of fairness have even been observed in 
non-human animals. In an experiment by Brosnan and DeWaal (2003), a capuchin 
monkey was offered a piece of cucumber in exchange for a pebble, a trade that she 
readily accepted. However, the monkey demonstrated significant agitation when she 
witnessed a monkey in an adjacent cage receive a more desirable grape for the same 
price. When the experimenter again offered the first monkey a cucumber in exchange for 
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a pebble, she demonstrated extreme agitation, and refused to exchange the pebble for the 
food at all, an action which capuchin normally engage in more than 95% of the time.  
 In spite of the strong preference for fairness, there are certain situations that 
reduce the impact of fairness as a decision rule. In a study on the scope of justice (the 
boundaries of when or to whom moral rules apply), Hafer, Conway, Cheung, Malyk, and 
Olson (2012) found that there is a curvilinear relation between psychological 
connectedness and the relevance of fairness. Historically, the scope of justice has been 
used primarily to explain negative, often large scale treatment such as genocide or other 
denials of rights (e.g., Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005). Hafer et al. (2012), 
however, found that exclusion from the scope of justice can be associated not only with 
negative, but also with positive behaviour. For example, when an individual is strongly 
psychologically connected to a target, such as a parent to a child, he or she may allocate 
positive resources to that target without consideration of whether the allocation is fair 
(e.g., whether it is similar to what others have received). Thus, fairness considerations are 
set aside, and the decision to help is made simply because the helper wants to assist the 
highly valued target. 
Similarly, Batson, Klein, Highberger, and Shaw (1995) found that induction of 
empathy can also reduce the salience of fairness as a decision making rule and lead to 
decisions that benefit a single target at the expense of other, equally deserving 
participants. In their study, Batson et al. (1995) asked participants to read a story about a 
terminally ill child, named Sheri. Participants were offered an opportunity to recommend 
that Sheri be moved into an Immediate Help Group, in which she would get preferential 
beneficial treatment. It was made clear that the Immediate Help Group was more resource 
Effects of SDO on Fairness  9 
 
 
intensive and that a number of children were already on the wait list, so moving Sheri 
into the group would be done at the expense of other, more needy children. Participants 
in the high empathy condition, who were instructed to try and imagine how the child felt 
and how her life had been affected by her illness, were significantly more likely to violate 
rules of fairness and offer help to Sheri than participants in the low empathy condition, 
even though participants in both conditions considered doing so to be less fair and less 
moral.  
SDO and Fairness 
It is not just empathy and psychological closeness that relate to selective 
application of fairness rules. There is also evidence that attitudes can influence such 
decisions, even when instructions for how to make decisions are clear. Kopko, Bryner, 
Budziak, Devine, and Nawara (2011) asked participants to engage in a simulation of a 
hand recount of ballots following a disputed election. They found that participants’ party 
identification and stake in the election significantly predicted whether ambiguous ballots 
would be interpreted as a vote for or against their preferred candidate. There was also a 
significant effect of clarity of instructions. The more concrete and clear the instructions 
were, the less likely participants were to systemically interpret ambiguous ballots as votes 
for their candidate of choice. Still, clearly written instructions did not eliminate the 
effects of party identification and personal stake in election results; they only served to 
minimize them. 
SDO is an attitude that also has significant implications in the domain of fairness 
and resource allocation. Amiot and Bourhis (2005) found that people who were high in 
SDO distributed resources in a manner that was discriminatory to outgroups and 
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favorable to their own ingroup, regardless of whether the allocation was positive (e.g., 
salary increases) or negative (e.g., increases in unpaid work hours). RWA, meanwhile, 
did not predict differential distribution between ingroup and outgroup members for either 
positive or negative allocations.  
Pratto, Tatar, and Conway-Lanz (1999) found that people who were high in SDO 
were more likely to focus on merit, rather than need, when allocating resources. 
Participants were presented with a series of scenarios in which they had to allocate a 
resource to one of two options. In each scenario, one option was clearly more in need of 
the resource, whereas the other option was more meritorious. In one example, 
participants were asked to choose between closing two schools, one with high test scores, 
but which was in a neighbourhood with an alternate community centre, and another with 
lower test scores, but no alternate location to serve as a community centre for the 
neighbourhood. In these forced choice decisions, high SDO individuals favoured the 
meritorious party over the needy party, whereas those lower in SDO favoured the needy 
party over the meritorious. In almost every scenario, however, the needy party was 
clearly low status (e.g., a paper boy who used his money to help his family; a small 
cooperative bank who focused on loans for single mothers and the working class). As 
such, it is not necessarily the case, as the authors conclude, that those high in SDO were 
allocating in favour of the meritorious. Rather, it is equally plausible that they were 
merely allocating resources away from the needy towards the higher status targets.  
More recent research supports the latter possibility. Son Hing et al. (2011) 
hypothesized that high SDO individuals demonstrate a preference for meritocracy only 
when it serves as a hierarchy-enhancing ideology. The authors distinguished between 
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prescriptive and descriptive meritocracy beliefs. Prescriptive meritocracy beliefs mean 
that meritocracy is a fair and equitable rule for distributing resources, whereas descriptive 
meritocracy beliefs mean that resources as they are currently distributed reflect a fair and 
equitable distribution based on merit (in other words, the people who have the most 
resources must have earned them). Results showed that high SDO was associated only 
with endorsement of descriptive meritocracy beliefs, in which belief in meritocracy 
serves a system-justifying purpose. However, lower SDO scores were associated with 
endorsement of prescriptive meritocracy beliefs. All of this research regarding SDO and 
the fair allocation of resources supports the core idea of SDO, which is that people who 
prefer to maintain hierarchies in society will act to do so when given the opportunity. 
Current Studies 
Recently, C. L. Hafer (personal communication, May, 2011) found that 
participants who were high in SDO were more likely to follow rules of fairness than 
participants who were low in SDO, when fair decisions meant that a sympathetic figure 
would not receive a beneficial outcome (similar to the study by Batson et al., 1995). 
Specifically, participants were given a set of guidelines for deciding whether or not a 
former child soldier would be transferred from prison to the more supportive environment 
of a refugee camp. After reading the story of a specific former child soldier who, 
according to provided guidelines, clearly qualified as a moderate priority to be moved 
from the prison to the refugee camp, participants rated on a scale of 1 to 5 how high a 
priority the child should receive. Participants high in SDO were more likely to rate the 
child the “correct,” moderate priority (3), whereas low SDO participants tended to give 
the child a higher priority rating.  These results suggest that low SDO individuals were 
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recommending more favorable treatment for the target than was fair, whereas high SDO 
individuals were making more fair decisions about how to distribute resources.  
However, in Hafer’s study, the child soldier was a low status individual.  Thus, to 
conclude that high SDO individuals are truly more fair, research must show that high 
SDO individuals are also more willing to follow guidelines requiring fair distribution of 
resources to high status individuals. Given that the core component of the SDO construct 
is a desire for group based dominance (Sidanius et al., 2004), it seems plausible that 
Hafer’s findings reflected the desire of high SDO individuals to behave negatively toward 
a low status target, rather than a concern with fairness. Because SDO is not just 
acceptance of group hierarchies, but also a desire for them, high SDO individuals may be 
motivated to give preferential treatment to high status individuals.  
This reasoning illustrates the concept of behavioral asymmetry, a key component 
of SDT (Sidanius, Levin, Federico, and Pratto, 2001). Behavioral asymmetry describes 
the discrepancy in behavior between high and low SDO individuals, typically in regards 
to ingroup favoritism. High SDO individuals, by definition, favor high status groups. 
When members of subordinate groups are high in SDO, those individuals are motivated 
to offer favorable treatment to dominant group members, regardless of the effect this 
treatment has on their ingroup (e.g., African Americans who are accused of being an 
“Uncle Tom” because they act preferentially toward whites). This is one of the most 
intriguing aspects of SDT; high SDO individuals treat high status groups preferentially, 
regardless of their own status.  In doing so, high SDO individuals from disadvantaged 
groups actively participate in the maintenance of the hierarchy in which they are 
disadvantaged, even if their behaviour may be actively harmful to their ingroup. 
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Conversely, individuals who are low in SDO are against group-based hierarchies. As 
such, they prefer to act in ways that attenuate hierarchies, regardless of ingroup 
identification.  
Interpreting the results from Hafer’s study in this context, we hypothesized that 
SDO was negatively related to favorable treatment of the low status target, rather than 
positively related to fair treatment. Therefore, in our first study, we varied the status of 
the target of help and predicted an interaction of SDO by target status, such that high 
SDO individuals making a decision about a low status target would be more fair (but less 
favorable) compared to low SDO individuals, whereas high SDO individuals making a 
decision about a high status target would be less fair (but more favorable) than low SDO 
individuals.  In other words, we hypothesized that individuals who are high in SDO 
would allocate resources disproportionately in favor of a high status person compared to 
a low status person, whereas individuals who are low in SDO were expected to allocate 
resources disproportionately in favor of a low status person compared to a high status 
person. 
Study 1 
Expanding the experimental design of C. L. Hafer (personal communication, 
May, 2011), participants were asked to make a decision about the fair allocation of 
resources for either a high status target or a low status target. Dispositional empathy, as 
well as several perceptions of the target, were measured to explore whether they 
predicted participants’ decisions and as possible mediators of the effects of the 
manipulations. 
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Method 
Participants. A total of 108 participants were recruited online using Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk), based on the recommendation of Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn 
(2013), who suggest that properly powered MTurk studies should have a minimum of 50 
participants per cell. Three participants were excluded from the final analyses because of 
missing data which made it impossible to test our hypothesis. Participants were 
compensated $0.25 for their participation. 
Materials. Participants first read a fictitious newspaper article that was designed 
to familiarize them with the issues surrounding organ transplants--specifically, the 
relative scarcity of organs. Using real statistics from the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, participants were told of the chronic organ shortages that 
cause patients to spend months or years awaiting available organs. Next, participants read 
a letter from the Michigan chapter of a fictional non-profit organization called the 
American Organ Donation Society, which claimed to be seeking layperson input in 
evaluating the priority of individual cases, in accordance with organizational bylaws. The 
letter also included a rubric which described the medical criteria used as guidelines for 
establishing patient priority.  
 After reading the criteria, participants were given a patient case file (see 
Appendix A for full versions of the files). They were told that the patient was randomly 
chosen, but all participants were given the file for a patient named John Kassa, which 
included some personal information (e.g., age, number of children), as well as the details 
of his medical history necessary to complete the priority ranking (e.g., time on wait list, 
general condition). The case file varied by condition. In the low status condition, John 
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Kassa was described as a grocery store clerk who made $28,000 a year, whereas in the 
high status condition, he was described as a business owner who made $160,000 a year.  
Post-Decisional Questionnaire. After assigning a priority rating, participants 
were asked to complete a series of questions assessing perceptions that might have been 
relevant to their rating. Specifically, on a scale from not at all (1) to very much (7), 
participants rated: perceived similarity to the patient, the relevance of justice to their 
decision (two items), how much they cared for the patient’s well-being, perceived 
identification with the patient, the importance of treating the patient fairly, the extent to 
which they could imagine the patient’s feelings (two items), perceived deservingness of 
the patient, and perceived need of the patient. Additionally, participants rated their mood 
on a scale of very negative (1) to very positive (7). See Appendix A for full set of 
questions. 
Fairness ratings. Our primary dependent variable was decision fairness, which 
was measured using a rating scale from low priority (1) to high priority (5) with a 
moderate priority rating (3) being the correct, fair decision based on the patient case file 
and the rating criteria provided (see Appendix A). 
Social Dominance Orientation. Social dominance orientation was measured 
using the Social Dominance Orientation-6 Scale developed by (Pratto et al., 2006). This 
is a 16-item scale in which participants are required to rate statements such as “Some 
groups of people are simply not the equals of others” and “Superior groups should 
dominate inferior groups” on scales from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). The 
SDO-6 Scale has been demonstrated to have good internal reliability ( = .83) as well as 
good test-retest reliability; participants tested at a three month interval showed a high 
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correlation between SDO scores at Time 1 and Time 2, r = .81, p < .01 (Pratto et al., 
2006). In our sample, the SDO-6 scale demonstrated high internal reliability,  = .90. 
 Trait empathy ratings. Empathy was measured using the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). The IRI is a 28-item self-report measure consisting of four 7-
item subscales. The Perspective-Taking subscale assesses the tendency to adopt another’s 
point of view (e.g., “I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a 
decision”). The Fantasy subscale assesses the tendency to adopt the feelings of a fictitious 
character, such as while reading a book or watching a movie (e.g., “I really get involved 
with the feelings of the characters in a novel”). The Empathic Concern subscale assesses 
feelings of sympathy and concern for unfortunate others (e.g., “When I see someone 
being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them”). Finally, the Personal 
Distress scale measures self-oriented feelings of anxiety or distress in uncomfortable 
social situations (e.g., “In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease”). The 
convergent and discriminant validity of these four indices are well established, as is the 
correlation of the overall IRI with other unidimensional measures of empathy (see Davis, 
1983). In our sample, the IRI demonstrated high internal reliability,  = .82. 
Procedure. Online participation took approximately 10-15 minutes. Participants 
began by reading the fake newspaper article outlining the problem of organ shortages in 
America, and the letter from a fictional non-profit organization requesting the 
participant’s input regarding a potential organ recipient. Participants were then presented 
with a case file for a fictional low or high status patient, and were asked to assign a 
priority rating to the patient based on the information contained in the patient file. Note 
that participants were not explicitly told to follow the guidelines provided in the letter. 
Effects of SDO on Fairness  17 
 
 
Next, participants were asked to complete the post-decisional questionnaire. Finally, 
participants completed the SDO-6 Scale and the IRI.  
Results 
 We tested our hypothesis by regressing priority rating scores on target status, 
mean SDO scores, and the interaction term of the two. The regression analysis confirmed 
our hypothesis. There was a significant interaction between SDO and target status, such 
that the relation between SDO and priority ratings was moderated by target status, r2 = 
.045, β = .216, p = .032 (see Figure 2). The interaction does not seem to be driven by just 
one of the subscales of SDO; in fact, the results appear to be driven almost equally by 
each subscale. Substituting the SDO-Dominance subscale for the overall SDO score and 
the status by SDO interaction term, we find that the interaction is only marginally 
significant, β = .365, p = .096. Doing the same for the SDO-Egalitarian subscale, we 
again find that the interaction is only marginally significant, β = .371, p = .096. Because 
SDO was measured after the target status manipulations, we checked to ensure that SDO 
did not differ as a function of condition. Participants in the low status (M = 2.86, SD = 
1.25) and high status (M = 2.88, SD = 1.19) conditions did not differ significantly in their 
mean SDO scores, t(103) = .098, p = .922. 
Though simple effects and simple slopes analyses were not significant, there are a 
number of supplementary analyses that allow interpretation of the interaction. First, we 
performed an a priori contrast of our specific hypothesis that participants would be more 
favourable and less fair towards the target that was congruent with their level of SDO 
(e.g., low SDO individuals will give higher ratings to the low status target than the high 
status target). Participants were divided into high SDO (M = 3.88, SD = .60) and low  
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Figure 2. The moderating effects of target status on priority rating in a positively framed 
allocation decision for high and low SDO individuals at one standard deviation above and 
below the mean. 
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SDO (M = 1.80, SD = .68) groups using a median split. This contrast yielded a significant 
result (t(103) = 1.90, p = .030), providing confirmation for our hypothesis that people 
would provide significantly higher ratings for their attitude congruent group  (M = 3.53, 
SD = .87) than for their attitude incongruent group (M = 3.23, SD = .73). In addition, the 
relation between SDO and fairness was examined in each of the target conditions 
independently, by testing the significance of the bivariate correlations using one-tailed 
tests of significance (given the a priori nature of our predictions). In the low status target 
condition, SDO was significantly and negatively related to priority rating: as SDO  
increased, the priority rating decreased (and fairness increased), r = -.227, p = .039. In the 
high status target condition, the relation between SDO and priority rating was positive, 
but only marginally significant, r = .218, p = .077. Regardless, this trend was compatible 
with our hypothesis, because as SDO increased, priority rating increased (and fairness 
decreased).  
When added as a predictor to the regression model, empathy did not add 
significantly to prediction of priority rating, β = .14, p = .176, and the interaction 
remained significant (r2 = .063, β = .223, p = .027).  Also, trait empathy correlated only 
marginally with participants’ fairness decisions, r = .192, p = .076. Each of the post-
decisional items was regressed on status, SDO, and the interaction term of the two. None 
of the items was significantly predicted by the interaction term, suggesting that they were 
not mediating factors responsible for the status by SDO effect. See Table 1 for inter-
correlations among the measures. Main effects of target status on post-decisional items 
were examined as well, but were almost entirely non-significant, and did not clarify the 
mechanism responsible for the interaction (see Table 2 for main effects of status). 
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Discussion 
The effects of SDO on fairness of priority ratings were moderated by target status. 
When making a decision about a low status target, consistent with Hafer (personal 
communication, May, 2011), people high in SDO assigned a less favorable but more fair 
priority rating, according to the guidelines provided, compared to individuals who were 
low in SDO. When making a decision about a high status person, however, high SDO 
individuals recommended unfairly favorable treatment, whereas people who were lower 
in SDO recommended a priority rating that was more fair, but less favorable. It should be 
noted that “high SDO” individuals did not have a score that was high on the SDO scale in 
an absolute sense. Rather, they were high only relative to the other participants. However,  
absolute means of just 2.5 on the SDO scale have been shown to be predictive of self-
selection to hierarchy-enhancing careers (Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius, & Siers, 1997) or 
discrimination towards outgroups (Pratto et al., 1999), and the “high SDO” group in the 
median split analyses reported above scored a mean of 3.88 on the 1 to 7 scale. 
What were the psychological mechanisms underlying the interaction?  Items from 
the post-decisional questionnaire were generally uninformative, as none of them were 
significantly predicted by the status by SDO interaction. It seems unlikely that ingroup 
favoritism (which has been associated with SDO in past research) was responsible for the 
current findings. Very few participants were likely business owners making $150,000 per 
year, but salary was the only distinguishing information about the target.1  In addition, to 
my knowledge, all of the research that has linked SDO and preferential allocation to the 
                                                          
1
 According to Ipeirotis (2010), over 80% of the users of MTurk are from the US or 
India, and less than 5% of American users and essentially 0% of Indian users have 
household incomes over $150,000. 
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ingroup has used a task in which participants divided a shared pool of resources between 
their ingroup and an outgroup (e.g., Amiot & Bourhis, 2005). By asking participants to 
make a decision about a single person with little distinguishing information, the present 
study reduced the likelihood that ingroup status would have a significant impact. 
Another factor closely associated with SDO-related discrimination is perceived 
competition (e.g., Crowson, 2009; Küpper, Wolf, & Zick, 2010). Because our fairness 
decision was framed in an organ donation context, perceived personal relevance of the 
resource being allocated was unlikely to have primed competitive world beliefs in a way 
that would have affected the priority rating. For one thing, need for an organ is relatively 
rare (1 in 2,600 Americans; United Network for Organ Sharing, 2012), so it is unlikely 
that participants in the study would be directly affected by this decision. Previous 
research has demonstrated that the prejudice associated with SDO is eliminated when 
there is no perceived competition between groups (Pratto & Glasford, 2008). Even if they 
did know someone who was in need of an organ transplant, the relevant other would have 
to be sufficiently psychologically close and specifically in need of a heart transplant in 
order for the fairness rating task to elicit any sort of perceived competition. Given these 
caveats, it seems unlikely that the effect of SDO on priority rating was driven by 
perceived competition. 
Thus, the findings may reflect the direct effects of SDO. As Sidanius, Pratto, van 
Laar, and Levin (2004) said, “…even after one is able to control for a wide variety of the 
situational, occupational, and socialization factors thought to contribute to SDO, we 
should still expect to find reliable individual differences in SDO, largely attributable to 
temperamental or personality factors." One important aspect of the current finding is the 
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situation in which the effect was found. In a context stripped of competition, perceived 
threat, and ingroup affiliation, and in direct violation of explicit instructions on how to 
fairly allocate a scarce resource, people high in SDO still chose to allocate resources 
disproportionately in favor of the high status patient, and people low in SDO chose to 
allocate resources disproportionately in favor of the low status patient. 
Study 2 
The design of this experiment was similar to that of Study 1, but with several 
modifications. The post-decisional questionnaire was shortened from 12 items to 6, by 
eliminating redundant or similar questions (e.g., “How relevant do you feel justice or 
fairness is to how this patient is treated?” and “How important do you feel it is that this 
patient is treated according to what is fair or just?”). A measure of household income was 
added to ensure that the effect in Study 1 was not driven by ingroup favouritism. We also 
expanded the priority rating scale from a five point scale to a seven point scale. In the 
initial study, relatively few participants (14) were unfairly unfavourable: less than 13% of 
participants suggested a priority rating lower than three out of five. Because of this, the 
majority of the variance in our study was restricted to three options. By expanding the 
rating scale to 7, we could use rating labels that kept our data comparable to Study 1, 
while allowing more opportunity for variance in the upper portion of the scale, where 
responses were likely to be concentrated. Another significant change was the addition of 
a second rating for each participant. By having each participant rate both a high and a low 
status target, our analysis shifted from between-subjects to within-subjects, which allows 
for a more powerful test while reducing the error variance resulting from individual 
differences between participants. 
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The IRI was dropped, because it was unrelated to the obtained interaction, and it 
was replaced with the global belief in a just world scale, in order to control for just world 
beliefs. Just world beliefs have been shown to correlate with SDO (Pratto et al., 1994), 
because they function as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth. This would suggest 
that high SDO individuals might be acting in an unfairly favourable way towards the high 
status target because of their belief in a just world. That is, they may think that the high 
status target deserves favourable treatment because he would not be wealthy unless he 
deserved to be.  Alternatively, strong beliefs in a just world (among high SDO 
individuals) might instead (or also) motivate helping behaviour to low status targets in 
order to make the world more fair.  Because of these unclear, but potentially significant 
effects of just world beliefs on the priority rating task, we decided it would be best to 
control for just world beliefs2.  
The final and most significant change was to frame participants’ allocation 
decisions negatively rather than positively.  In Study 1, participants were asked to give a 
priority rating to previously unrated patients, with higher priority ratings reflecting a 
positive allocation.  In the current study, participants were told that all patients had 
previously been given a high priority rating, but the lack of organs now required that 
some patients be lowered in priority. Thus, participants were asked to decide whether 
previously highly-rated patients should be assigned a lower priority.  Previous research 
has made it clear that people assign value differently to the same objective outcome when 
it is given vs. when it is taken away (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). As such, we thought 
that testing participants ratings in the negatively framed allocation context would increase 
                                                          
2
 Although some of the variance attributable to SDO is represented by participants’ just 
world beliefs, we were primarily interested in the unique variance of SDO. 
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generalizability of the findings from Study 1. This negative framing was not expected to 
change the pattern of results: we hypothesized that participants would be unfairly 
favourable towards their attitude congruent group, and more fair, but less favourable, 
towards their attitude incongruent group. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 149 participants were recruited online using MTurk, 
based on the 50 participants per cell minimum recommended by Simmons, Nelson, and 
Simonsohn (2013), and were compensated $0.25 for their participation. Ten participants 
were removed because of missing data which made it impossible to test our hypothesis. 
Another 13 participants were removed because they failed to correctly answer a question 
designed as an attention check, leaving 126 participants in the final analyses. 
Materials. Participants again read the same fictitious newspaper article as in 
Study 1 to familiarize them with the issues surrounding organ transplants. Next, 
participants read the letter from the Michigan chapter of the American Organ Donation 
Society, which sought layperson input in evaluating the priority of individual cases, in 
accordance with organizational bylaws. The letter also included a rubric which described 
the medical criteria used as guidelines for establishing patient priority. However, the 
letter in this study differed in one important way from the letter in Study 1. Participants 
were told that the number of available organs was going to be even smaller than initially 
projected. As a result, participants would be seeing the files of patients who were 
previously given a high priority to receive an available organ and would be asked to re-
evaluate these patients according to “significantly more stringent guidelines”. Participants 
were then presented with the new rubric. 
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 After reading the criteria, participants were given two patient case files. Again, 
they were told that the patients were randomly chosen, but all participants were given one 
file for a grocery store clerk named John Kassa, who made $28,000 a year, and a second 
file for a business owner named Perry Dimery, who made $145,000. Other than that, the 
patients were very similar in terms of both personal information (e.g., age, marital status, 
number of children) and the details of their medical history necessary to complete the 
priority ranking (e.g., time on wait list, general condition; see Appendix B for details).  
Post-decisional questionnaire. After assigning a priority rating, participants were 
asked to complete a series of questions assessing perceptions that might have been 
relevant to their rating. Specifically, on a scale from not at all (1) to very much (7), 
participants rated: perceived similarity to the patient, the relevance of justice to their 
decision, how much they cared for the patient’s well-being, perceived identification with 
the patient, and perceived deservingness of the patient. Participants also rated their mood 
on a scale of very negative (1) to very positive (7).  (see Appendix B for full set of 
questions). 
Fairness ratings. Our primary dependent variable was again decision fairness, 
which was once more measured using a rating scale. But this time, the answer scale was 
7-points, ranging from low priority (1) to high priority (7), with a moderate priority 
rating (4) being the correct, fair decision based on the patient case file and the rating 
criteria provided. 
Social dominance orientation. Social dominance orientation was again measured 
using the Social Dominance Orientation-6 Scale developed by Pratto et al. (2006). In our 
sample, the SDO-6 scale had high internal reliability,  = .91. 
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 Just world beliefs. Just world beliefs were measured using the Global Belief in a 
Just World Scale (GBJWS; Lipkus, 1991). The GBJWS is a 16-item scale in which 
participants are required to rate statements such as “I feel that people get what they are 
entitled to have” and “I basically feel that the world is a fair place” on scales from 
strongly disagree (-3) to strongly agree (3). It has been shown to have acceptable internal 
reliability (α = .83; Lipkus, 1991). In our sample, the GBJWS scale demonstrated high 
internal reliability,  = .88. 
Procedure. Online participation took approximately 10-15 minutes. Participants 
began by reading the fake newspaper article outlining the problem of organ shortages in 
America, and the letter from a fictional non-profit organization requesting the 
participant’s input regarding the re-ranking of previously high priority potential organ 
recipients. Participants were then presented with case files for fictional low and high 
status patients and were asked to assign priority ratings to the patients based on the 
information contained in the patient files. Participants were asked to carefully read the 
rating criteria, but were not explicitly told to follow the guidelines provided in the letter. 
Participants were asked to complete the post-decisional questionnaire after assigning a 
rating to the first patient presented to them, before reading and responding to the file of 
the second patient. Finally, participants completed the SDO-6 Scale and the GBJWS, as 
well as answering several demographic questions.  
Results 
Our primary analysis tested our hypothesis by regressing priority ratings scores on 
target status, mean SDO scores, and the interaction of target status and mean SDO scores, 
with BJW included as a control variable. We found partial support for our hypothesis. 
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Note that, although we attempted to mirror the analytic techniques used in Study 1, some 
differences were necessary given the constraints of within-subjects analyses. Our initial 
analysis did not reveal a significant interaction between target status and SDO on priority 
ratings, F(1,124) = 2.61, p = .101. However, when the planned covariates, BJW and 
household income, were included, the interaction became significant, F(1,122) = 6.75, p 
= .011. Household income did not significantly add to this model (F(1,122) = 2.26, p = 
.135), nor did it correlate with ratings for low status targets (r = -.149, p = .095), ratings 
for high status targets (r = -.068, p = .450), SDO (r = -.128, p = .152), or BJW (r = -.012, 
p = .898). As a result, household income was dropped from all subsequent analyses. 
Running our primary analysis again, with only BJW as a covariate, we again found a 
significant interaction, F(1,123) = 5.76, p = .018, which is illustrated in Figure 3. As in 
Study 1, the interaction did not seem to be driven by just one subscale of SDO. Both the 
SDO-Dominance subscale and SDO-Egalitarian subscale produced marginally significant 
interactions when controlling for BJW (F(1,123) = 3.87, p = .051, and F(1,123) = 3.31, p 
= .071, respectively).  
Tests of the simple slopes indicate that SDO was a significant negative predictor 
of ratings of low status targets (β = -.249, t(1,123) = -2.56, p = .012), but not a significant 
predictor of ratings of high status targets (β = -.051, t(1,123) = -.51, p = .614). Though 
software limitations for conducting post hoc tests on within-subject design with a 
continuous predictor prevent a test of simple main effects, an ad hoc analysis allowed us 
to compare differences in priority ratings within levels of SDO. Participants were 
separated into high SDO (M = 3.65, SD = .60) and low SDO (M = 1.74, SD = .59) groups, 
using a median split. Low SDO individuals provided a significantly higher priority rating  
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Figure 3. The moderating effects of target status on priority rating in a negatively framed 
allocation decision for high and low SDO individuals at one standard deviation above and 
below the mean. Belief in a just world was included as a covariate. 
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for the low status target (M = 5.40, SD = 1.34) than the high status target (M = 4.92, SD = 
1.15; t(1,62) = 3.51, p = .001). High SDO individuals, however, did not differ 
significantly in the priority ratings assigned to the low status target (M = 5.19, SD = 1.26) 
and the high status target (M = 5.00, SD = 1.27; t(1,62) = 1.368, p = .176). Again, we 
performed an a priori contrast of our specific hypothesis that participants would be more 
favourable and less fair towards the target that was congruent with their level of SDO. 
Participants gave marginally higher ratings to their attitude congruent group (M = 5.19, 
SD = 1.31) compared to ratings for their attitude incongruent group (M = 5.05, SD = 1.21; 
t(1,125) = 1.41, p = .085). Overall, it seems that in a negatively framed allocation 
decision, low SDO individuals behaved as we hypothesized, acting more favourably 
towards the low status target than towards the high status target. High SDO individuals, 
however, more closely followed the fairness guidelines and were equally favourable (and 
equally harsh) to both high and low status individuals.  
Regressing each of the post-questionnaire items on SDO, target status, and the 
interaction term revealed no significant interactions, suggesting these perceptions were 
not mediating the effects of SDO on priority ratings. Care for the patient’s well-being, 
believing the patient deserved help, perceived similarity to the patient, and identification 
with the patient revealed significant relations, and these were all main effects of SDO, 
independent of target status (high SDO scores were associated with less care for the 
patient’s well-being, lower ratings of patient deservingness, higher perceived similarity to 
the patient, and higher levels of identification with the patient).  See Table 3 for inter-
correlations among the measures. Main effects of target status on post-decisional items 
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were again examined, and were again non-significant (see Table 4 for main effects of 
status). 
Discussion 
The effects of SDO on fairness of priority ratings were once again moderated by 
target status. The pattern, however, was somewhat different than in Study 1. Low SDO 
individuals demonstrated the same pattern as in Study 1, such that they were more 
favourable and less fair when assigning a priority rating to a low status target than when 
V
ariable:
 
SDO
BJW
PRLS
PRHS
Inco
m
e
Sim
ilar
Justice
W
ell
-b
eing
Id
entify
D
eserve
M
ean
 sco
re
 o
n
 SDO
-6
 scale
-
.469
*
*
-
.101
.021
-
.128
.184
*
.065
-
.186
*
.203
*
-
.382
*
*
.469
*
*
-
.199
*
.131
-
.012
.193
*
.270
*
*
.192
*
.221
*
-
.023
P
rio
rity
 rating
 assigned
 to
 the
 lo
w
 
-
.101
.199
*
-
.620
*
*
-
.149
.057
.239
*
*
.366
*
*
.145
.325
*
*
.021
.131
.620
*
*
-
-
.068
.022
.291
*
*
.277
*
*
.093
.275
*
*
T
otal
 ho
usehold
 inco
m
e
-
.128
-
.012
-
.149
-
.068
-
-
.096
-
.113
-
.015
-
.005
.047
P
erceived
 sim
ilarity
 to
 the
 p
atient
.184
*
.193
*
.057
.022
-
.096
-
.272
*
*
.049
.624
*
*
.057
P
erceived
 relevance
 of
 justice
 and
 
.065
.270
*
*
.239
*
*
.291
*
*
-
.113
.272
*
*
-
.229
*
*
.302
*
*
.230
*
-
.186
*
.192
*
.366
*
*
.277
*
*
-
.015
.049
.229
*
*
-
.117
.483
*
*
.203
*
.221
*
.145
.093
-
.005
.624
*
*
.302
*
*
.117
-
.011
-
.382
*
*
-
.023
.325
*
*
.275
*
*
.047
.057
.230
*
.483
*
*
.011
-
P
articip
ant
's
 current
 m
o
od
.132
.205
*
.066
.052
-
.113
.213
*
.132
.059
.271
*
*
.066
-
.217
*
-
.159
.014
-
.039
.121
-
.058
.027
.090
-
.132
-
.007
*
 C
o
rrelatio
n
 is
 significant
 at
 the
 
.05
 level
 (tw
o
-tailed)
.
 
*
*
 C
o
rrelatio
n
 is
 significant
 at
 the
 
.01
 level
 (tw
o
-tailed)
.
 
C
o
rrelatio
n
s
 b
etw
een
 S
o
cial
 D
o
m
in
a
n
ce
 O
rientatio
n
,
 B
elief
 in
 a
 Ju
st
 W
o
rld
,
 
D
em
og
raphics
,
 a
nd
 P
o
st
-D
ecisio
n
al
 Q
u
estio
n
n
aire
 Item
s
P
erceived
 id
entificatio
n
 w
ith
 the
 
P
erceived
 d
eservingness
 of
 help
 fo
r
 
P
erceived
 im
p
o
rtance
 of
 p
atient
's
 
P
rio
rity
 rating
 assigned
 to
 the
 high
 
M
ean
 sco
re
 o
n
 Interp
erso
nal
 
Effects of SDO on Fairness  33 
 
 
making a judgment about a high status target. High SDO individuals were equally fair, 
regardless of target status, and were significantly more fair and less favourable than low 
SDO individuals when assigning priority ratings to the low status target. Once again, it is 
worth noting that “high SDO” does not denote individuals that had a score that was high 
on the SDO scale in an absolute sense, but rather a score that was high relative to the 
other participants (“high SDO” participants in the median split analyses scored a mean of 
3.65 on the 1 to 7 scale).  
There are a number of mechanisms we can rule out in this study, as we did in the 
first. We can once again conclude, with even more confidence, that the effect is not 
driven by ingroup favoritism. Because participants could distinguish between targets 
based only on occupation and salary, household income would be the primary  
determinant of ingroup vs. outgroup status. But household income did not add to our 
regression model, nor did it correlate in a meaningful way with any variables that would 
imply a role in individuals’ decision making. It also remains unlikely that perceived 
competition was driving the effect, because the resource being allocated was unlikely to 
be personally relevant to the participants, for the same reasons given after Study 1.  
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These results match more closely with Hafer’s (personal communication, 2011) 
initial results, in which high SDO individuals were more fair than low SDO individuals. 
Her speculative interpretation was that the differences related to SDO were a function of 
differences in empathy. Although trait empathy is negatively related to SDO, and low 
SDO individuals are more empathetic in general, the patterns demonstrated with both the 
IRI in Study 1 and the post-decisional items in both studies suggest it was not empathy 
driving our results.  
The interaction in Study 2, however, is consistent with a psychological process 
closely related to empathy, called deontological inclination. An fMRI study by Greene et 
al. (2001) indicated that moral decision making may be driven by two separate 
processes—a cognitive evaluation of the benefits and detriments of an action (called 
utilitarianism) and an affective reaction to potential harm caused by the action (called 
deontology). Since then, a number of studies have found converging evidence for the 
involvement of two separate processes in moral decision making (e.g., Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013; Greene, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007). Two sets of findings suggest that 
differences in deontological processing may account for the findings from our second 
study.  
First, Conway and Gawronski (2013) found that an empathy-induction 
manipulation significantly increased deontological inclinations, but did not affect 
utilitarian inclinations. That is, by making the target of harm more salient, there was a 
greater aversion to harm and an increased tendency to make decisions that avoided 
harming the target, regardless of the possible benefits of the action for others. This 
explanation matches our results for the low SDO individuals in both studies. Low SDO 
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individuals are generally empathetic towards low status individuals (Brauer & Bourhis, 
2006), but presumably less empathetic towards high status individuals. The empathy may 
have engendered more deontological inclinations when deciding about the low status 
target, which made the harm caused by a fair decision (lowering the patient’s priority 
rating) particularly salient to the low SDO individuals. Thus, it may have been more 
difficult for the low SDO individuals to suppress their deontological inclinations towards 
the low status target, which was required to make the fair, utilitarian decision. 
Second, it may be that high SDO individuals are generally lower in deontological 
inclinations than low SDO people. To my knowledge, there is no direct evidence for this 
idea, but some indirect evidence is consistent with it. First, Piff, Stancato, Côté, 
Mendoza-Denton, and Keltner (2012) demonstrated across a series of studies that higher 
socio-economic class individuals (and lower socio-economic class individuals who are 
primed to act like higher class people) exhibit more unethical behaviour. One 
interpretation of this finding could be that high social status (which correlates with SDO, 
see Sidanius et al., 2004) is associated with weaker deontological inclinations (e.g., less 
empathy) without corresponding increases in utilitarian inclinations, thereby producing 
weaker moral inclinations overall and more unethical behaviour.  
But Côté, Piff, and Willer (2012) found that social status was positively 
associated with utilitarianism, so increased utilitarianism might be expected to 
compensate for any reduced deontological inclinations in high status (and high SDO) 
individuals. However, the association made between social status and utilitarianism relied 
on an older method of measuring the two inclinations, which reveals only the relative 
strength of deontology vs. utilitarianism, not their individual levels. Therefore, it is 
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unclear whether Cote et al.’s (2012) findings reflect stronger utilitarian inclinations or 
weaker deontological inclinations (or both) among high social status individuals 
compared to low social status individuals.3 Fortunately, Conway and Gawronski (2013) 
have developed a process dissociation technique to obtain separate measures of 
utilitarianism and deontology. Future research should investigate SDO differences on the 
two independent measures. Perhaps high SDO individuals are lower in deontological 
inclinations than low SDO individuals, with no differences in utilitarianism, which 
resulted in their relatively harsh treatment of both high status and low status targets in 
Study 2. 
General Discussion 
 Overall, the results of the two studies provide support for our initial hypothesis 
that target status moderates the relation between SDO and fairness in a limited resource 
allocation decision. The studies also revealed some differences, however, between 
positively framed (Study 1) and negatively framed (Study 2) allocation decisions. 
Previous research suggests that two forms of morality exist, prescriptive and proscriptive 
(Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Prescriptive morality relates primarily to 
positive outcomes and is focused on what should be done. Proscriptive morality relates 
                                                          
3
 As an example of the problems with the older method of measuring the two inclinations, 
previous work using the unidimensional utilitarian-deontological scale initially suggested 
that utilitarian inclinations were positively associated with psychopathy, 
Machiavellianism, and belief in the meaninglessness of life (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). 
When utilitarian and deontological inclinations were measured separately, however, these 
prototypically immoral character traits were not actually related to increased utilitarian 
inclinations, but rather decreased deontological inclinations. Utilitarian inclinations were 
equal across groups (Conway, Bartels, & Pizarro, in submission). These findings, given 
the generally positive relation between SDO and social status (Sidanius et al., 2004), 
suggest that these differences may account for the moderating effects of target status on 
the relation between SDO and fairness in a negative resource allocation context. 
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primarily to negative outcomes and is focused and what is a wrong way to act, what we 
should not do. Perhaps the positive and negative frames elicited different patterns of 
prescriptive and proscriptive morality reasoning in the two studies, thus producing 
somewhat different patterns of moderation in high SDO participants.  
 Overall, results were mixed as to who was fair and when. Taken together, the 
results suggest that low SDO individuals followed fairness guidelines less closely than 
high SDO individuals. That is, on average across the two studies, low SDO participants 
were somewhat less likely to follow guidelines that ensured a fair and equitable 
distribution of outcomes than high SDO participants. If, as discussed above, 
deontological inclinations vary as a function of SDO, we can use this as a theoretical 
foundation on which to build an interpretation of both studies.  
 In Study 1, it is plausible that affective reactions to harm did not play a significant 
role in the decision making process. The only salient individual in the decision was the 
patient described in the file. The harm, in that scenario, was dealt to an anonymous other, 
part of a group of sick people presented only as numbers in an article. Recent research 
suggests that individuals do not feel empathetic towards large groups of people. For 
example, Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007) found that participants engaged in 
charitable giving based on a distinction between what they call identifiable victims and 
statistical victims. People are likely to give more money to identifiable victims then 
statistical victims, even when they know that giving to statistical victims will make a 
bigger difference. By getting people to engage in deliberative thought, this discrepancy 
can be eliminated, but it is eliminated by reducing the amount given to identifiable 
victims rather than increasing the amount given to statistical victims. The authors suggest 
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that participants are able to suppress their sympathy towards identifiable victims by 
engaging in deliberative thought, but that deliberative thought does not help generate 
sympathy towards statistical victims. In the context of Study 1, this reasoning suggests 
that those who would be harmed by giving the target an unfairly favorable priority rating 
were not salient and did not arouse empathy, which would suppress deontological 
reasoning.  
Thus, both low and high SDO participants in Study 1 may have been guided by 
utilitarian reasoning rather than deontological considerations. But why did target status 
produce differences in priority ratings for low and high SDO participants if everyone was 
using utilitarian reasoning?  Presumably, SDO is associated with different beliefs about 
the utility (value) of low and high status persons. That is, although everyone may have 
used the same process, the elements’ weights in participants’ utilitarian “calculus” may 
have varied. People low in SDO believe that the world will be better if group hierarchies 
are attenuated. As part of their utilitarian reasoning, they might justify being more 
unfairly favourable towards a low status target by projecting greater overall outcomes 
from helping this individual. Low SDO persons may convince themselves that, although 
they are violating fairness rules, they are optimizing outcomes by keeping the patient 
from unnecessarily consuming health care dollars and keeping his family from needing 
state assistance. For a high status target, the same low SDO individuals may justify their 
more fair decision by thinking that the wealthy person can afford health care until he is 
able to get a transplant, and his wife and children will be well cared for, so there is no 
reason to violate fairness rules. Conversely, high SDO individuals could make an unfair 
judgment in favour of a high status target by reasoning that they are keeping a job creator 
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active and contributing to his community. The low status target, from the perspective of 
high SDO individuals, is entitled to the organ according to the rules of fairness, so he will 
still be given a fair priority, but because the low status person does not add much value to 
the greater society, an unfairly favourable judgment is not justified. In both cases, the 
utilitarian inclinations of each SDO group may be equivalent, and equally biasing, but 
their attitudes toward and beliefs about the target lead to opposite conclusions. 
 As a negatively framed allocation decision, Study 2 required participants to 
decide whether to delay an individual’s access to a badly needed resource. In a sense, the 
task required participants to assign harm to an identifiable victim for the potential 
advantage of statistical beneficiaries. As such, the most salient aspect of the decision was 
the harm done to the target person by a fair decision. If high SDO individuals have 
weaker deontological inclinations, then it may have been easier for them to simply rely 
on the fairness guidelines in making their allocation decisions. Conversely, low SDO 
individuals (with stronger deontological inclinations) may have felt a particularly strong 
aversion to harming the low status target, for whom they felt particular empathy, whereas 
the high status victim elicited less empathy.  
 These conclusions are somewhat counterintuitive, because they suggest that the 
most fair decisions were made by the least moral people (i.e., the people with the weakest 
deontological inclinations, namely high SDO participants). This counterintuitive aspect 
of the findings, however, presumably reflects the nature of the allocation decision in 
Study 2:  participants were deciding whether to lower someone’s chances for survival, 
and the fair decision required a harmful priority rating.  
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 It is worth noting that almost everybody was either fair or unfairly favourable to 
the targets in the studies. That is, very few ratings assigned a lower priority rating to the 
patient than the fairness guidelines suggested (only 14 out of 105 ratings in Study 1 and 
19 out of 252 ratings in Study 2). It is encouraging that people did not use their biases as 
a basis for discrimination, in that there was very little unfairly negative treatment. SDT 
states that in order for a society to maintain a stable hierarchy, the inequality must be 
sufficiently small so that it is not morally offensive (Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 
2001). It may be that the best way to maintain a hierarchy without offending others is by 
being unfairly favourable to some people rather than being unfairly unfavourable to some 
people. There are certain cases, such as hiring decisions, where it is difficult to separate 
dominant group favouritism from subordinate group discrimination. When choosing 
between two job candidates, preferentially hiring a dominant group member is 
indistinguishable from deliberately not hiring a subordinate group member. In fact, this 
has been shown to be an effective way of entrenching hierarchies (Pratto et al., 1997). 
But in the context of larger scale policy decisions, it may be more palatable to both 
dominant and subordinate group members to propose a law that cuts capital gains tax 
than to propose a law that diverts funding for children living in poverty to the retirement 
funds of already wealthy individuals. In fact, studies of American government policies 
suggest that this may be occurring. When Americans with different income levels hold 
differing policy opinions, policy decisions strongly reflect the desires of the affluent, with 
little consideration of the preferences of lower and middle class individuals (Gilens, 
2005). It may be that the best way to keep a subordinate group down is by doing favours 
for those in the dominant group. 
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Future Directions 
 There are two studies suggested by interpretations of the present findings based 
on deontological and utilitarian decision-making. The first study would simply establish 
that high and low SDO individuals differ in their deontological and utilitarian 
inclinations. By having participants complete the series of moral dilemmas created by 
Conway and Gawronski (2013) and the SDO-6 scale (Pratto et al., 2006), it would be 
possible to test whether deontological inclinations are negatively predicted by SDO, 
whereas utilitarian inclinations are unrelated to SDO. 
 The second study would test the hypothesis that SDO predicts differential 
increases in deontological inclinations in response to specific, empathy inducing stimuli. 
Several studies have established that deontological inclinations can be increased by 
presenting participants with empathy inducing images (e.g., Amit & Greene, 2012; 
Conway & Gawronski, 2013). By again using the battery of moral dilemmas from 
Conway and Gawronski (2013) and pairing them with pictures of obviously low or high 
status persons who allegedly constitute the targets in the dilemmas, it would be possible 
to see whether SDO individuals are differentially susceptible to empathy induction in a 
decision context. If both of these studies provided support for the hypotheses, confidence 
in this interpretation of the present studies would be increased substantially. 
Conclusions 
Across both studies, we found that target status moderated the relation between 
SDO and the fairness of allocation decisions. People were equally unfairly favourable 
towards their attitude congruent group in the positively framed allocation decision. In the 
negatively framed allocation decision, low SDO individuals demonstrated the same 
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pattern, providing more favourable ratings to the low status target, and more fair ratings 
to the high status target, whereas high SDO individuals rated both targets equally fairly.  
Moral research has generally concluded that the best moral decisions are made 
when both deontological and utilitarian considerations are weighed, and the final decision 
is reached by balancing both of these mechanisms (e.g., Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Conway 
& Gawronski, 2013; Greene & Haidt, 2002). Thus, in order to make a moral, utilitarian 
decision, the allocation of harm must be considered by the decision maker. This is not to 
say that truly moral decisions are always driven by deontological considerations, but 
rather, in order for a utilitarian decision to be made morally and not just economically, it 
must involve a full understanding of the subjective and societal cost of making another 
human suffer for the greater good.  
If the moral reasoning interpretation of these studies is valid, then, to my 
knowledge, Study 2 is unique in providing evidence of a situation in which the quality (in 
this case, the fairness) of a decision’s outcome is negatively related to either moral 
inclination (in this case, negatively related to deontological reasoning, which is stronger 
in low SDO persons). It is important to emphasize, however, just how narrow a situation 
this study created: it was a situation in which the decision maker was weighing the 
possible removal of a valued designation for an identifiable victim against an unclear 
number of statistical beneficiaries, with clearly established guidelines for the decision, 
when the resource had no personal value to the decision maker. In a situation that 
matches all of these criteria, the data suggest that the best person to make this decision 
may be the one who feels the least empathy for the target. 
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Appendix A – Study 1 Materials 
Organ Donation Background Article 
Waiting on Life: National Organ Shortage Remains a Serious Problem 
By: Thomas White 
AP Reporter 
Representatives of The American Organ Retention and Transplant Association 
(AORTA), a special interest group focused on addressing shortages in available organs 
for patients in need of a transplant, spoke today before the Senate Subcommittee of 
Labor, Health, and Human Services, in an attempt to increase funding for organ donation 
programs across all 50 states. “Unfortunately, a patient in need of an organ transplant 
cannot count on that organ being available. People are simply not donating their organs at 
the rate we need to meet demand,” reported Frank Mitchell, a spokesperson for AORTA.  
According to the United Network for Organ Sharing, a national organ donation registry 
run by the Department of Health and Human Services, more than 114,000 Americans are 
currently awaiting an organ transplant, which amounts to roughly 1 in every 2,600 
people. The CIA World Factbook estimates that more than 6,800 people per day die in 
America, but less than 10% of these people are registered to donate their organs when 
they die. 
“The fact is, there shouldn’t be a shortage at all. But organ donation is a difficult 
decision. Research suggests that people are not necessarily opposed to donating their 
organs, but they don’t like to think about the issue so they just do nothing, and that means 
their organs cannot be used to save lives when they pass away,” added Mitchell.  
Despite recommendations by AORTA, and several other organizations focused on 
increasing organ donation, the American government has continually ignored suggestions 
for concrete steps to increase donation rates, such as conversion to a donor opt-out 
system, a change that has dramatically increased donation rates in several European 
countries, including Finland and Sweden.  
“Awareness of chronic organ shortages is important. Our number one objective is to save 
more lives, and without a tangible increase in donations, we can’t do that,” stated Linda 
Bartell, a volunteer at the American Organ Donation Society. Most people awaiting organ 
transplant spend at least two years on the donor list. For patients facing life-threatening 
organ failures, long delays are literally a matter of life and death.  
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Fictional Letter from American Organ Donation Society 
 
How far that little candle throws his beams! So shines a good deed in a weary world.  
                       ~William Shakespeare 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
I am writing to you as president of the Michigan Chapter of the American Organ 
Donation Society (AODS) to request your input regarding a case we are currently 
reviewing. The AODS is a non-profit organization that was established in 1994, created 
upon the recognition that not enough was being done to increase the number of 
Americans willing to donate their organs to help save lives.  
 
The mission of the AODS is to help these patients get the organs they need more 
quickly. One important part of the organ transplant process is identifying those patients 
most in need.  Currently, our organization is working to evaluate specific cases. 
Obviously, not every patient awaiting transplant can receive immediate help, and some 
cannot be helped at all. 
 
The waiting list is arranged by priority levels, which are based upon several factors. 
Patients in the “high priority” level are given attention before all others, and are the first 
to receive an available organ. Unfortunately, patients’ chances of receiving an organ 
decrease as they are assigned a lower priority number.  
 
As you can imagine, these decisions are difficult to make. The bylaws of our 
organization (Section IVa) require more than one opinion to be taken into account in each 
patient’s case. Thus, the AODS is working to acquire input into the decision made on 
many different cases. We are asking you to provide your input on one of these. 
 
See the following information on the criteria that are considered in determining 
priority: 
 
 Waiting List Priority Scale                            Criteria for Placement 
 
Level 5 
High Priority 
 
Time on Wait List: 4+ years 
or 
Health Condition: life-threatening 
Level 4 
Above Average Priority 
 
Time on Wait List: 2-4 years 
or 
Health Condition: critical 
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Level 3 
Moderate Priority 
 
Time on Wait List: 1-2 years 
or 
Health Condition: poor 
Level 2 
Average Priority 
 
Time on Wait List: 7-12 months 
or 
Health Condition: deteriorating 
Level 1 
Low Priority 
 
Time on Wait List: 1-6 months 
or 
Health Condition: relatively good 
 
 
You will now be asked to read some information describing a randomly selected 
person who is on the transplant list. After reading this information, please indicate which 
priority level you would recommend for this particular patient. Your input, along with 
that of other research participants and members of nonprofit organizations across the 
country, will be factored into our final decisions. Please be assured that all answers are 
kept anonymous. 
 
On behalf of the AODS, we thank you for your time and appreciate your 
consideration of our cause. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Alice Murray 
President, Michigan Chapter 
American Organ Donation Society 
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Patient Files and Priority Rating 
             
 
American Organ Donation Society (AODS) 
 
Waiting List Priority Scale 
                                                                                                                                         
 
High Status Target (Business Owner):   
 
Patient Case #2141-S 
 
Full Name: John William Kassa 
 
Age: 42 
 
Family status: Married, with two children 
 
Occupation: Business owner 
 
Annual Income: $160,000 
 
Diagnosis: Congestive heart failure 
 
Time on Transplant List: 18 months 
 
Patient Summary: Shortly after his 40th birthday, John Kassa was diagnosed with 
congestive heart failure. After nearly a year of treatments proved ineffective, Mr. Kassa 
was put onto the heart transplant list. However, the delay has taken its toll on his health, 
which has steadily deteriorated. According to his family doctor, Dr. Steven Walling, 
“John’s condition is not yet critical, but he is definitely in poor health, and without a 
transplant, it’s only going to get worse.” 
 
Low Status Target (Grocery Store Clerk):   
 
Patient Case #2141-S 
 
Full Name: John William Kassa 
 
Age: 42 
 
Family status: Married, with two children 
 
Occupation: Clerk at grocery store 
 
Annual Income: $28,000  
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Diagnosis: Congestive heart failure 
 
Time on Transplant List: 18 months 
 
Patient Summary: Shortly after his 40th birthday, John Kassa was diagnosed with 
congestive heart failure. After nearly a year of treatments proved ineffective, Mr. Kassa 
was put onto the heart transplant list. However, the delay has taken its toll on his health, 
which has steadily deteriorated. According to his family doctor, Dr. Steven Walling, 
“John’s condition is not yet critical, but he is definitely in poor health, and without a 
transplant, it’s only going to get worse.” 
            
  
 
Please circle the priority level that you wish to assign to the patient in this case. All 
answers 
will remain anonymous. 
 
   Low                      Average               Moderate        Above Average            High  
Priority                    Priority     Priority    Priority        Priority 
           
     1    2         3                    4           5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A M E R I C A N  O R G A N  D O N A T I O N  S O C I E T Y  
1 0 8  N O R T H  4 T H  A V E .  
A N N  A R B O R ,  M I C H I G A N ,  4 8 1 0 7  
C H A R I T A B L E  R E G I S T R A T I O N  # 2 2 8 9 3 7 8 8 8 H H 0 0 3 4   
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Post-Decision Questionnaire (Hafer, 2011) 
 
1-7 Scale, not at all – very much, plus one open ended question 
 
Please answer these questions according to your personal opinion. There are no right or 
wrong answers. 
 
1.  How similar do you think the patient in the article is to you? 
 
2. How relevant do you feel justice or fairness is to how this patient is treated? 
 
3.  In this situation, how much do you care about this patient’s wellbeing? 
 
4.  How much do you identify with the patient? 
 
5. How important do you feel it is that this patient is treated according to what is fair or 
just? 
 
6. To what extent can you imagine what it would be like to be the patient in this 
situation? 
 
7. How much should justice or fairness (as opposed to other issues) be considered in 
deciding what to do with this patient? 
 
8. To what extent can you feel what the patient must feel in this situation? 
 
9. To what extent do you think this patient deserves to be helped? 
 
10. To what extent do you think this patient is in need of help? 
 
11. What is your current mood? 
 1-7 Scale, very negative – very positive 
 
12. Using the space below, please describe what you were thinking while you decided 
which priority level should be assigned to the patient. 
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Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) 
 
1-5 Scale, does not describe me very well – describes me very well 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you. READ EACH ITEM 
CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Please answer as honestly as you can. 
 
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me.  
 
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
 
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.  
 
4.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
 
5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. 
 
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. 
 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely 
caught up in it.  
 
8.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.  
 
9.  When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.  
 
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.  
 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their 
      perspective.  
 
12.  Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. 
 
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. 
 
14.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
people's 
      arguments. 
 
16.  After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. 
 
17.  Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.  
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18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity 
for them.     
 
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.  
 
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
 
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.  
 
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.  
 
23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
       character.  
 
24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies.  
 
25.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.  
 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me.  
 
27.  When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.  
 
28.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their 
place. 
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Social Dominance Orientation Scale-6 (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) 
 
Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each 
statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement. 
 
 1-7 Scale, strongly disagree – strongly agree 
 
1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others. 
 
2. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups (R). 
 
3. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against 
other groups. 
 
4. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
 
5. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally (R). 
 
6. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
 
7. No one group should dominate in society (R). 
 
8. Group equality should be our ideal (R). 
  
9. All groups should be given an equal chance in life (R). 
 
10.  We must increase social equality (R). 
  
11.  Superior groups should dominate inferior groups. 
 
12.   It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are 
at the bottom. 
 
13.  We must strive to make incomes more equal (R). 
 
14.  Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
  
15.  It would be good if all groups could be equal (R). 
 
16.  Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
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Appendix B – Study 2 Materials 
Organ Donation Background Article 
Waiting on Life: National Organ Shortage Remains a Serious Problem 
By: Thomas White 
AP Reporter 
Representatives of The American Organ Retention and Transplant Association 
(AORTA), a special interest group focused on addressing shortages in available organs 
for patients in need of a transplant, spoke today before the Senate Subcommittee of 
Labor, Health, and Human Services, in an attempt to increase funding for organ donation 
programs across all 50 states. “Unfortunately, a patient in need of an organ transplant 
cannot count on that organ being available. People are simply not donating their organs at 
the rate we need to meet demand,” reported Frank Mitchell, a spokesperson for AORTA.  
According to the United Network for Organ Sharing, a national organ donation registry 
run by the Department of Health and Human Services, more than 114,000 Americans are 
currently awaiting an organ transplant, which amounts to roughly 1 in every 2,600 
people. The CIA World Factbook estimates that more than 6,800 people per day die in 
America, but less than 10% of these people are registered to donate their organs when 
they die. 
“The fact is, there shouldn’t be a shortage at all. But organ donation is a difficult 
decision. Research suggests that people are not necessarily opposed to donating their 
organs, but they don’t like to think about the issue so they just do nothing, and that means 
their organs cannot be used to save lives when they pass away,” added Mitchell.  
Despite recommendations by AORTA, and several other organizations focused on 
increasing organ donation, the American government has continually ignored suggestions 
for concrete steps to increase donation rates, such as conversion to a donor opt-out 
system, a change that has dramatically increased donation rates in several European 
countries, including Finland and Sweden.  
“Awareness of chronic organ shortages is important. Our number one objective is to save 
more lives, and without a tangible increase in donations, we can’t do that,” stated Linda 
Bartell, a volunteer at the American Organ Donation Society. Most people awaiting organ 
transplant spend at least two years on the donor list. For patients facing life-threatening 
organ failures, long delays are literally a matter of life and death.  
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Fictional Letter from American Organ Donation Society 
 
How far that little candle throws his beams! So shines a good deed in a weary world.  
                       ~William Shakespeare 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
I am writing to you as president of the Michigan Chapter of the American Organ 
Donation Society (AODS) to request your input regarding specific cases we are currently 
reviewing. The mission of the AODS is to help these patients get the organs they need 
more quickly.  
 
One important part of the organ transplant process is identifying those patients most 
in need.  Obviously, not every patient awaiting transplant can receive immediate help, 
and some cannot be helped at all. The waiting list is arranged by priority levels, which are 
based upon several factors. Patients in the “high priority” level are given attention before 
all others, and are the first to receive an available organ. Unfortunately, patients’ chances 
of receiving an organ decrease as they are assigned a lower priority number, making 
these decisions very difficult and extremely important.  
 
Recently, things have gotten even worse because fewer organs have been available 
than expected.  Therefore, we have had to revise our priority rating system to make it 
more difficult to receive a “high priority” rating.  As a result, we unfortunately must 
reassess a number of patient files, in order to assign patients lower priorities consistent 
with the new rating criteria. This means a number of patients will not be receiving 
organs as early as they were previously told, and maybe not at all. The bylaws of our 
organization (Section IVa) require more than one opinion to be taken into account in each 
patient’s case. Thus, the AODS is working to acquire input into the decision made on 
many different cases. We are asking you to provide your input on a small number of 
these. 
  
Thus, in order to accommodate the reduced number of organs, we have had to 
create significantly more stringent guidelines for distributing organs. Below are the 
revised criteria that are currently being used in determining priority. Please read them 
carefully: 
 
  
Waiting List Priority Scale                            Criteria for Placement 
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Level 7 
High Priority 
 
Time on Wait List: 4+ years 
or 
Health Condition: life-threatening 
Level 6  
Level 5 
 
Level 4 
Moderate Priority 
 
Time on Wait List: 1-2 years 
or 
Health Condition: poor 
Level 3  
Level 2 
 
Level 1 
Low Priority 
 
Time on Wait List: 1-6 months 
or 
Health Condition: relatively good 
 
 
You will now be asked to read two case files, each describing a randomly selected 
person who was previously rated as a high priority (Level 7). After carefully reading this 
information, please indicate whether a lower priority might be assigned to this patient by 
indicating which priority level you would recommend. Your input, along with that of 
other research participants and members of nonprofit organizations across the country, 
will be factored into our final decisions. Please be assured that all answers are kept 
anonymous. 
 
On behalf of the AODS, we thank you for your time and appreciate your 
consideration of our cause. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Alice Murray 
President, Michigan Chapter 
American Organ Donation Society 
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Patient Files and Priority Rating 
             
 
American Organ Donation Society (AODS) 
 
Waiting List Priority Scale 
                                                                                                                                         
 
High Status Target (Business Owner):   
 
Patient Case #2028-W 
Full Name: Perry Dimery 
Age: 49 
Family status: Married, with one child 
Occupation: Business Owner 
Annual Income: $145,000 
Diagnosis: Coronary artery disease w/ scarring 
Time on Transplant List: 16 months 
Condition: Poor 
Primary Symptoms: 
• angina 
• difficulty breathing or shortness of breath 
• indigestion/ choking feeling 
• Rapid or irregular heart beats 
Low Status Target (Grocery Store Clerk):   
 
Patient Case #3177-W 
Full Name: John Kassa 
Age: 42 
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Family status: Married, with two children 
Occupation: Grocery store clerk 
Annual Income: $28,000 
Diagnosis: Congestive heart failure 
Time on Transplant List: 14 months 
Current Condition: Poor 
Primary Symptoms: 
• fatigue and weakness 
• shortness of breath 
• swollen ankles 
• accumulation of fluid in the abdomen 
• bluish skin around the mouth 
            
  
 
Please circle the priority level that you wish to assign to the patient in this case. All 
answers 
will remain anonymous. 
 
   Low                          Moderate            High  
Priority                        Priority                           Priority 
           
     1    2           3      4              5             6          7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A M E R I C A N  O R G A N  D O N A T I O N  S O C I E T Y  
1 0 8  N O R T H  4 T H  A V E .  
A N N  A R B O R ,  M I C H I G A N ,  4 8 1 0 7  
C H A R I T A B L E  R E G I S T R A T I O N  # 2 2 8 9 3 7 8 8 8 H H 0 0 3 4   
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Demographics 
 
Are you male or female? 
 -Male 
 -Female 
 
Please tell us your age. 
 
What is your approximate household income? 
- $0 – $29,999 
- $30,000 - $49,999 
- $50,000 - $74,999 
- $75,000 - $99,999 
- $100,000 - $149,999 
- $150,000+ 
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Post-Decision Questionnaire (Hafer, 2011) 
 
1-7 Scale, not at all – very much, plus one open ended question 
 
Please answer these questions according to your personal opinion. There are no right or 
wrong answers. 
 
1.  Excluding his health status, how similar do you think the patient in the article is to 
you? 
 
2. How relevant do you feel justice or fairness is to how this patient is treated? 
 
3.  In this situation, how much do you care about this patient’s wellbeing? 
 
4.  Excluding his health status, how much do you identify with the patient? 
 
5. To what extent do you think this patient deserves to be helped? 
 
6. What is your current mood?  
 1-7 Scale, very negative – very positive 
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Social Dominance Orientation Scale-6 (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) 
 
Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each 
statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement. 
 
 1-7 Scale, strongly disagree – strongly agree 
 
1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others. 
 
2. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups (R). 
 
3. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against 
other groups. 
 
4. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
 
5. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally (R). 
 
6. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
 
7. No one group should dominate in society (R). 
 
8. Group equality should be our ideal (R). 
  
9. All groups should be given an equal chance in life (R). 
 
10.  We must increase social equality (R). 
  
11.  Superior groups should dominate inferior groups. 
 
12.   It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are 
at the bottom. 
 
13.  We must strive to make incomes more equal (R). 
 
14.  Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
  
15.  It would be good if all groups could be equal (R). 
 
16.  Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
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Global Belief in a Just World Scale (Lipkus, 2001) 
 
The following is a study of opinions about the good and bad things that happen to people. 
The best answer to each question is your personal opinion. You may find yourself 
agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly about others, 
and perhaps uncertain about others. Whether you agree or disagree with any statement, 
you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do. 
 
 Mark each statement in the right margin according to how much you agree or 
disagree with it. Circle +1, +2, +3, or –1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case. 
 
-3 - +3 scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree 
 
1.  I feel that people get what they are entitled to have. 
 
2.  I feel that a person’s efforts are noticed and rewarded. 
 
3.  I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get. 
 
4.  I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on themselves. 
 
5.  I feel that people get what they deserve. 
 
6.  I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given. 
 
7.  I basically feel that the world is a fair place. 
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Attention Check  
 
If you are reading this carefully, please select “0”. (Inserted into Global Belief in a Just 
World Scale) 
-3 - +3 scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree 
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Appendix C – Ethics Approval Forms 
Study 1 Ethics Approval Form 
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Study 2 Ethics Approval Form 
 
  
Effects of SDO on Fairness  71 
 
 
Joel B. Armstrong 
 
University of Western Ontario 
Department of Psychology 
Social Science Centre – London, Ontario Canada N6A 5C2 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Master of Science, Social Psychology, London, Ontario, 2013 
 Thesis: The Moderating Effects of Target Status on the Relation Between SDO 
and Fairness  
 Advisor: Dr. James M. Olson 
 
Bachelor of Arts, Honours, Psychology, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, 2007 
 Thesis: The Effect of Active Driving Pedals on Sleepiness While Driving 
 Advisor: Dr. Alistair W. MacLean 
 
HONOURS AND AWARDS 
 
2011-2013  Western Graduate Research Scholarship 
 
2004-2007 Dean’s Honour List, Queen’s University 
 
COMMITTEE WORK 
 
Sept. 2012 – present M.Sc. Representative, Western Social Psychology Area 
Committee 
 
Sept. 2006 – April 2007 Merchandise Coordinator, Psychology Departmental 
Student Council, Queen’s University  
 
Sept. 2006 – April 2007 Webmaster, Psychology Departmental Student Council, 
Queen’s University  
 
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS AND POSTERS 
 
Armstrong, J. B., & Olson, J. M. (2013, June). The Rich Get Richer: Social Dominance 
Orientation Predicts Unfairly Favourable Treatment. Poster presented at the 
Canadian Psychological Association Convention, Quebec City, QC. 
 
Armstrong, J. B., & Olson, J. M. (2013, May). Tough But Fair: Target Status Moderates 
the Relation Between Social Dominance Orientation and Fairness. Poster 
presented at the Association for Psychological Science Convention, Washington, 
DC. 
 
Effects of SDO on Fairness  72 
 
 
Armstrong, J. B., & Olson, J. M. (2013, May). Tough But Fair: Target Status Moderates 
the Relation Between Social Dominance Orientation and Fairness. Poster 
presented at the Western-Waterloo Annual Social Psychology Conference, 
Waterloo, ON. 
 
Armstrong, J. B., & Olson, J. M. (2013, January). The Prime We Need, Not the Prime 
We Deserve: Attainability Decreases Prosocial Motivation for Real but not 
Fictional Moral Exemplars. Poster presented at the Society for Personality and 
Social Psychology Conference, New Orleans, LA. 
 
Armstrong, J. B. & MacLean, A. W. (2007, April). Active Pedals: The Effects of 
Exercise on Sleepiness While Driving. Poster presented at the Queen’s University 
Psychology Capstone Honours Research Conference, Queen’s University, 
Kingston, ON. 
 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE  
 
Sept. 2011 – present University of Western Ontario, Supervisor: J. M. Olson, 
Ph.D. 
 
Sept. 2006 – April 2007 Queen’s University, Supervisor: A. W. MacLean, Ph.D. 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 
Jan. 2013 – April 2013 Tutorial Instructor, University of Western Ontario 
PSYC 3723G Attitudes and Attitude Change 
 
Sept. 2012 – Dec. 2012 Teaching Assistant, University of Western Ontario 
    PSYC 2070B Social Psychology 
 
Jan. 2012 – April 2012 Tutorial Instructor, University of Western Ontario 
PSYC 3723G Attitudes and Attitude Change  
 
Sept. 2011 – Dec. 2011 Teaching Assistant, University of Western Ontario 
PSYC 2990A Applications of Psychology 
 
SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP 
 
Jan. 2013 – present  Canadian Psychological Association 
 
June 2012 – present  Association for Psychology Science 
 
Dec. 2011 – present  Society for Personality and Social Psychology 
 
 
 
